Supplier bank detail change risk
Sort one request to change a supplier's or contractor's bank details: not a bank change, already verified, verify by callback before paying, or hold as likely fraud, so finance teams stop paying invoices into accounts controlled by impostors.
F@fLimits to keep in mind
This classifier supports a payment control; it does not replace your company's approval rules, dual sign-off or your bank's fraud checks.
If money may already have been sent to a fraudulent account, call your bank immediately to try a recall and report it to the police or your national fraud reporting service.
Lookalike domains and spoofed numbers can be very convincing; when in doubt, treat the request as unverified.
Problem
Payment redirection fraud is one of the costliest scams for small and mid-sized businesses. An email that looks like it comes from a real supplier, often from a hacked mailbox or a lookalike domain, says the bank account has changed and asks to pay open invoices to the new account. Finance and office staff are busy, the message is polite and urgent, and once the money is sent it is rarely recovered.
Goal
Label each request so routine messages that are not bank changes move on, changes that were already confirmed through an independent known channel are processed, plausible but unverified changes are held until a callback on a number already on file, and requests with strong fraud signals are frozen and escalated, with a human deciding when the facts are unclear.
Input / state
One request or message about a supplier's payment details: the text, who sent it and how, what is known about the supplier, and what payments are due.
- request_text
- The message or form as received: what it asks for, the new account details if any, the reasons given and any deadlines or pressure.
- sender_and_channel
- How it arrived (email, portal, letter, phone, chat) and the sender address or number, including whether the domain or number matches what is on file.
- vendor_history
- What is known about the supplier: how long you have paid them, the bank country and name on file, earlier changes, and any recent contact through a known channel.
- payment_context
- Optional: invoices due and their amounts, whether a payment run is imminent, and whether anyone has already called the supplier back on a number from your own records.
Decision question
bank_change_riskHow risky is this request to change a supplier's payment details? Use not_a_bank_change when the message does not ask to change where money is paid. Use verified_change when the change was confirmed through an independent channel you already trusted. Use verify_by_callback when the change is plausible but not yet confirmed. Use likely_fraud_hold when it shows strong fraud signals. Use needs_review when key facts are missing or conflicting.
Options
not_a_bank_changeThe message is about something else: a remittance advice, a new invoice to the account already on file, a statement, a price change or an address update with no change to the bank account or payee.verified_changeA change of bank details that someone already confirmed by calling the supplier on a phone number from your own records or contract (not from the message), or through a supplier portal account you set up earlier, and the new account name matches the supplier.verify_by_callbackA plausible change from a known supplier with no strong warning signs, but not yet confirmed through an independent channel. Payments to the new account should wait until someone calls the supplier on a number already on file.likely_fraud_holdStrong fraud signals: a lookalike or newly changed sender domain, a reply-to address that differs, pressure to pay today or keep it confidential, an account in a personal name or another country, a request to redirect invoices already due, or a callback number supplied only in the message.
Allowed outcomes
Decided in your code from the answer and its confidence. Thresholds are yours to set and test.
- Finance lead reviews before any changeConfidence is below your threshold, the supplier or channel cannot be identified, the facts conflict, or a payment run is due before anyone can verify.
- Not a bank change, handle normallyChoice is not_a_bank_change and confidence meets your threshold.
- Update the details after a second checkChoice is verified_change and confidence meets your threshold; a second person approves the update in the payment system.
- Hold payments and call back on file numberChoice is verify_by_callback and confidence meets your threshold.
- Freeze payments and escalate as fraudChoice is likely_fraud_hold and confidence meets your threshold.
Example scenarios
Predefined demonstrations. No model is called; the outcome shown is an illustrative judgment.
Example state
{
"request_text": "Please find attached our remittance advice for invoice 4471. Thank you for your payment.",
"vendor_history": "Packaging supplier paid monthly for 4 years, same bank since 2021",
"payment_context": "No invoices due this week",
"sender_and_channel": "Email from accounts@greenleaf-packaging.com, the domain on file"
}Outcome
IllustrativeChoice is not_a_bank_change and confidence meets your threshold.
Why
The message only confirms a payment and asks for no change to where money is paid.
Using it well
- Never verify a bank change using contact details from the same message, its signature or a link in it; only a phone number or portal already in your own records counts.
- A message from the supplier's real address can still be fraud: mailboxes get hacked, so a matching domain alone never makes a change verified_change.
- Pressure signals (pay today, the CEO is waiting, keep this confidential, our auditors require it) and a request to redirect invoices already due push toward likely_fraud_hold.
- A new account in a different country, a different bank name, or an account holder name that does not match the supplier's legal name is a strong warning sign.
- A change made through the supplier portal you already use, or a signed letter followed by a callback on the number on file, can be verified_change.
- If a payment run is due before anyone can call back, choose needs_review or verify_by_callback and pay to the old account or wait; never pay the new account to avoid a late fee.
Request definition
POST https://api.typesafe.ai/v1/systemone{
"model": "jev-latest",
"state": {
"request_text": "<request_text>",
"sender_and_channel": "<sender_and_channel>",
"vendor_history": "<vendor_history>",
"payment_context": "<payment_context>"
},
"questions": {
"bank_change_risk": {
"type": "choice",
"instructions": "How risky is this request to change a supplier's payment details? Use not_a_bank_change when the message does not ask to change where money is paid. Use verified_change when the change was confirmed through an independent channel you already trusted. Use verify_by_callback when the change is plausible but not yet confirmed. Use likely_fraud_hold when it shows strong fraud signals. Use needs_review when key facts are missing or conflicting.",
"criteria": {
"not_a_bank_change": "The message is about something else: a remittance advice, a new invoice to the account already on file, a statement, a price change or an address update with no change to the bank account or payee.",
"verified_change": "A change of bank details that someone already confirmed by calling the supplier on a phone number from your own records or contract (not from the message), or through a supplier portal account you set up earlier, and the new account name matches the supplier.",
"verify_by_callback": "A plausible change from a known supplier with no strong warning signs, but not yet confirmed through an independent channel. Payments to the new account should wait until someone calls the supplier on a number already on file.",
"likely_fraud_hold": "Strong fraud signals: a lookalike or newly changed sender domain, a reply-to address that differs, pressure to pay today or keep it confidential, an account in a personal name or another country, a request to redirect invoices already due, or a callback number supplied only in the message."
}
}
}
}Request shape from the System One API reference; a Kev server accepts the same body. Replace the placeholder state with your data. Requests need your own API key or server.
Version History
Initial version